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In this paper we consider recent proposals to auctionU.S. import quotas.
using the funds so obtained to encourage relocationout of the protected
industries.We argue that the information available to thegovernment, or lack
thereof, is a critical factor in understanding thesepolicies.In a world or full
information, it makes little sense to use auction quotasrather than tariffs.
Similarly, itis unclear why an elaborate program of temporaryprotection is
needed, rather than immediately opening trade andcompensating people with an
income transfer.When the government has Limited information,however, these
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The Increased use ofvoluntar1export restraints (VERs) on international trade.
rather than tariffs, has allowed suppIing nations to capture the quotarents through higher
prices for their exports.Recent poIic proposals have called for the auctionof U.S. import
quotas, allowing the U.S. treasurU to obtain the revenues instead.The fundS so obtained
could be used to encourage relocation of workers out of protected industries, with the goal
of reducing and eventualig eliminating the protection.This type of poltc was tnitiall
analUsed bU Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982). and brought into the U.S. policU arena bU Hufbuaer
and Rosen (1986). Lawrence and Litan (1 966) and Bergsten •t a! (1 987).1The latter authors
estimate that rents from existing U.S. quotas on steel, machine tools, sugar and dairW as
$5.15 billion, while lower estimates of $3.7-4.7 billion are provided bu Parker (1987).At
a time of high budget deficits in the U.S.. this potential source of revenue has attracted
Congressional and media attention.2Elsewhere, quotas have been auctioned in the last few
uears bU the governments of New Zealand. Australia. Taiwan. Brazil. Pakistan. Singapore and
India.
These policies are in part a polItical compromise between the government, firmsand
workers, which mag account for their popular appeal, but can theg be givena solid economic
justification?In this paper we shall argue that the information available to the
government, or lack thereof,Is a critical factor in understanding these policies.In a
world of full information, it makes little sense to use quota auctions rather than tariffs.
Similarly. It is unclear why an elaborate program of temporary protection is needed, rather
than Immediately opening trade, and compensating individuals with income transfers.When
the government has limited information, however, these policies become quite sensible and
See also Bhagwatl (1988, pp. 118 and following).
2Media examples are Newsweek, January 12. 1967, p. 40; The Wall Street JournaL, Februarg
6. 1987. p. 40; and Business Week. March 9. 1987. p. 27,Congrssional discussion of quota
auctions Is summarized in Bergsten •t a! (1967. chap. 1).may even be optimal.
In the first part of our paper, we discuss quota auctions.Mathematical economists
have in the Last decade developed techniques for analysing auctions Ingeneral.3But there
seems to have been little communication between the mathematical and trade economists.
There exists an unexploited gain from trade.We shall show In section 2 and 3 that the
theoretical analysis can be used, at a quite practical level, to supplement the
recommendations of Bergsten at al (1987).We examine how well quota auctions serve as
Information-revelation devices, and we of fer some suggestions on how quota auctions should
be designed.
In the second part of our paper, we discuss that optimal design of trade anddomestic
policies, under incomplete (asymmetric) information.When agents In the economy have
information that Is private to themselves. the can have an Incentive to misrepresent this
Information so as to shift policies in their favor.For example. the exact losses due to
trade Liberalization are best viewed as the private information of workers and firms, and
are not directly observed by the government.If the government asked individuals what their
losses are it would certainly get exaggerated responses.Under such circumstances, we
know from the Revelation Principle that the government can safely restrict its attention to
incentive compatiblepolicies, whIch induce workers and firms to truthfully reveal their
Information.4In sections 4 and 5, w• shall see that optimal policies which take into
account the informational constraints resembl• the actual proposals discussed above, and
differ from those obtained with complete information.Conclusions and directions for
further research are discussed In sectIon 0.
3This work is surveyed by McAfee and licHillan (1987). Milgrom (1985. 1987. 1989). and
Wilson (1987).
4According to the Revelation Principle, any allocation resulting from policies which induce
lying can be replicated by a truth telling policy.See Mgerson (1979).
22.Auctions as Information Revealing Devices
Why auction import quotas: why, for that matter, are auctions used at all?Why does
Sotheby's auction a Van Gogh. rather than simply putting a price tag on It?The obvious
answer is that Sotheby's does not have enough information about the potential buyers'
willingness to pay for the painting to be able to price It satisfactorily; the auction yields
a higher return for Sothebg's than fixing a price.An auction, in other words, is
fundamentally a device for revealing and aggregating information.Thus an analysis of
auctions must recognize that information is dispersed and incomplete.
Empirical trade economists find it difficult to estimate the protective effect of any
given import quota.The government setting the quota faces a similar informational
handicap.In elementary trade theory, tariffs and quotas are equivalent; but if information
Is incomplete It is Impossible for the government to compute the exact tariff equivalent of
any given quota.
Bidders in quota auctions likewise have informational problems.At the time of
bidding. they can only make informed guesses about the future market demand and cost
conditions that will determine how much profit they can earn from having an import
license.Let us model the bidders as each having different, partial bits of information
about the true value of a quota license; a bidders estimate is on average correct, but in any
particular case it could be too high or too low.
More precisely, the analysis being developed here assumes that the common-value model
appliesto quota auctions.That Is. there is some true but, at the time of bidding, unknown
value of a quota licinca, V.if the bidders' estimates of this true value are denoted v1, v2.
then the assumption is that the vs are independent draws from some commonlg known
distribution H(v,IV) (Wilson 1977).In practice, bidders might differ not only in their
information but also in their ability to extract profit from an Import ltcence the bidders'
valuations might be if flUe ted (Milgrom mid Weber, I 982).Most of the results to be
discussed in section 3 apply to thIs more general case.Note, however, one sense In which
the models do not precisely fit the quota auctions.In the models, either an indivisible
item is auctioned, or several units are auctioned but each bidder wants only ,one unit (as in
Milgrom 1985).Bidders in quota auctions bid quantities as well as prices.
3The bidders decide their bids using what they know about the value of winning.A
phenomenon melodramatically named the winners curse now arises.Suppose all bidders bid
amounts that, based on their own value estimates, would yield reasonable profits if they
won the bidding.,Then the winner will typically make a loss.The highest bidder is the one
whose estimate is the most optimistic.WinnLng conveys bad news; it tells the winner that
his rivals' value estimates are lower than his.The winner is the bidder who most
overestimates the value of winning.
A rational bidder anticipates the winner's curse when choosing his bid.He does this
by basing his bid not only on his value estimate, but also on the presumption that his value
estimate is higher than anyone else's.When this presumption is false, It is costless, for
he will not win the bidding in that case.When the presumption Is correct, It prevents
unpleasant surprises after winning.Thus rational bidding in the face of the winners curse
involves bidding cautiously, well below what one's own information Indicates Is the value
of winning.The idea of the winner's curse, and of bidding conservatively so as to escape it,
underlie most of the results to follow.
Any auction, then, is a device for revealing information, for the bids reflect the
bidders' estimates of the value of winning.Quota auctions are often discussed as a method
for revealing the size of the protective effect of a quota (Takacs. 1988).How accurate is
the informatIon provided by the auction?Because of the winner's curse, bid revenue
underestimates the quota's protective effect.But a remarkable and subtle theorem (due to
Wilson, 1977. and generalized by Milgrom. 1979) says that th. extent of underestimation
becomes smaller as the number of bidders rises:if there is enough bidding competition, the
Information revealed is almost perfect.More precisely, if a single item Is being auctioned
and information about its true value is sufficiently dispersed among the bidders, then the
selling price converges to the true value as the number of bIdders becomes arbitrarily large.
Thus, with a large number of bidders, the sellIng price is equal to the true value even
though no individual In the economy knows what thIs true value Is and no communicationamong the bidders occurs.The bidding process serves to aggregate the bidders' separate
pieces of information.
However. If the number of bidders is small enough that the bidding is imperfectly
competitive, the bids Incorporate some profit for the bidders; the winning bid is
sUsteqnaticailM below the true value of the quota.Two conclusions follow.First. in
assessing the protective effect of he quota, some correction factor must be added to the
bids to compensate for the small number of bidders, or else the protective effect will be
underestimated.Second. in designing the auctions. It mag be possible for the government to
use tricks to stimulate the bidding competition and drive up the bids; some such tricks will
be discussed In the next section.
How small Is asmallnumber of bidders?Converselg. how mang bidders must there
be before the bidding is effectivelg perfectlg competitive?This Is an empirical question;
some evidence comes from the analogous case of U.S. Treuurg bill auctions.The relults of
Cammack (1965) indicate that the number of bidders for 1-bills Is small enough for the
cautious bidding induced bg the winner's curse to show up in the data.In particular.
Cammack finds that the average auction price was significantlg less than the next dag's
secondarg-market price, and that the profit from bidding in the auction Increased with the
dispersion of opinion among the bidders.The number of bidders Is not stated, but theg
consist of government-authorized dealers, as well as commercial banks, large corporations.
and Investment funds.Since there are tgpicallg about 40 dealers (Stigurn.1 983). there
must be mare than 40 bidders.Evldentlg. 40 Is asmall number of bidders In terms of the
previous discussion.
How mang bidders would there be if the U.S. government auctioned import quotas?
For same, but not all. items one might expect bidders to number in the hundreds, so that
winner's curse effects might be relativelg small.6But since most of the policies to be
Under the current quota sgstem. the number of licensed importers is about 500 for
cheese. 160 for steel. 400 for footwear, and 40 for raw sugar (Bergsten at a!. 1987. p. 43).
5discussed in the next section are easy to implement, they are justified even if the potential
gains are small.In addition, even It the winner's curse does not arise, some form of
auction is preferable to the administrative aLlocation of quota licences.As emphasized by
Anderson (1 988),a quota auction (like a tariff) achieves an arbitrageefficiency by
equalizing the rents earned on each unit Imported.He finds that the actual allocation of
quotas In the U.S. datr industry does not satisfy thiscondition, leading to a substantial
deadweight loss relative to an auction with the same level ofimports.
3.Design of Auction Quotas
Suppose now that th. number of bidders in a quota auction Is small enough thattheir
expected profits from participating In the auction arepositive.7Then the design of the
auction matters, for itIs possible for the government to regain some of these profits.
This section summarizes some theorems that Identify ways of extracting some profits that
would otherwise be left to the bidders.
A uniform-price auction yields more revenue than a discriminating auction (Milgrorn and
Weber. 1982; Mtlgrom, 1985).
In the New Zealand quota auctions, for example, each successful bidder pays the
price; the auction Is a discriminating auction.In the Australian quota auctions, by
contrast, all successful bidders pay an amount equal to the lowest accepted bid; the auction
is a uniform-price auction.Theory says that the latter raises more revenue.This is
because, as noted, bidders discount their own information when they bid, so as to avoid the
winner's curse.In the discriminating auction, the price a successful bidder pays depends
7We will assume, however, that production of the good in question takes place under
perfect competition.As discussed by Krishna (1988a.b), oligopolistlc pricing of a good can
substantially affect the quota rents, and therefore, the amount available from a quota
auction.OnlU on his own bid.In a uniform-price auction, the price depends in addition on others'
bids.Thus, the price he p'us reflects others' information as well as his owns he can afford
to discount his own information less when choosing his bid. Each bidder is rationally less
cautious in the uniform-price auction than in the discriminating auction, so the bids are
higher.
The U.S. government uses both dlscriminator and uniform-price auctions to sell
Trsasurg bills, though usuallU the former.SOme Treasurg studies have compared the
performance of the two auction forms.The results, summarized bg Baker (1976), are
consistent with the above theorem:the uniform-pric, auctions seemed to generate the
higher revenue.
An openauctionyields more revenue than either a discriminating or a uniform-priceauction
(tiligrom and Weber; 1982. Mulgrom. 1985). -
An open auction is the auction form tUpicaliW used in the sale of antiques and art:
bids are called openlg, and bidders can raise their bids If they want to staV in the running.
The argument Is essenttallU the same as above.tiore information is conveged bU the open
auction than the uniform-price auction, so the winner's-curse discounting factor is still
smaller and bids are higher.Itis, perhaps, corroborative of this theorem that private-
sector sellers usuallU choose opn auctions rather than sealed-bid auctions (Cassad, 1967.
p. 66).It is usuallg the public sector that uses sealed bidding.
An open auction need not be so undignified as to have people shoutIng out their bids:
it could be run on linked computers, for example. TM essential feature is that all bidders
know the current best bid and can raise their bids whenever thej want.
The open auction does have one disadvantage, however.Our maintained assumption is
that the bIdders are not able to coordinate their bids.The dispersion of Information makes
collusion more difficult than in simple oligopolU models (McAfee and McMillan.1 988).But
7if the bidders can somehow overcome the hindrances to coordination, they are more likeig to
succeed In colluding In an open auction than to a sealed-bid auction, as Bergsten eta! (1987)
pointed out.This Is because a cartel must give its members an incentive not to seek short-
run gains bU deviating from the prescribed bidding behavior.The sanction against deviation
Is the threat of retaliation, in the form of high bids.With sealed-bid auctions, retaliation
can come onlU in subsequent auctions, for the deviation is not observed bU theother bidders
until after the auction.In open auctions, In contrast, retaliation can occur immediately, so
the threat of retaliation is more persuasive (Mllgrom. 1987).
Mead (1987) gives some evidence that collusion Is more frequent in timber-rights
auctions when the government uses open auctions than when It uses sealed-bid auctions.Is
collusion likely in import-quota auctions?Further evidence from timber auctions suggests
not.Mead. Schniepp. and Watson (1983) found that, in those auctions in which only local
firms bid, prices did not go much above the reserve price.But when there was competition
from firms from outside the region, prices were typically two or three times the reserve
price.Collusion, apparently, was not possible with outsiders bidding.itis presumably at
least as difficult to organize collusion in quota auctions, involving nation-wide
competition, as in the timber auctions with nonlocal bidders.
Tb. gov.rrw'nentwould increase Itsrevenuefrom thequota auctions by Imposing reserve
prices(Myerson,198hRiley and Samuelson. 1981; Mllgrom and Weber, 1982).
There is a trade—off.The advantageof a reserve (I.e.. minimum) price is that in
some cases it forces bidders to bid higher than they would In the absence of the reserve
price.The disadvantage Is that on some occasions bidders' estimates of the value of
winning are so low as to leave a part of the quota unsold at the reserve price.The reserve
price is optlmallg set at the level that balances these two effects.The foregoing result
sags that maximizing expected revenue requires that the reserve price be set high enoughthat, with positive probability, not all the licences will be sold.A conflict exists.
however. betwsen raising revenue and opening trade.In the event that the reserve price is
a binding constraint, trade Is restricted more than under the original quota.
The government should require royalty payments based on the returns from selling the items
subsequently Imported under the quota(McAfee and McMlllan. 1986).
S
Suppose it Is feasible for the government to monitor the uses to which the awarded
quotas are put, so that It can implement a royalty scheme based on the realized
profitability of the import ltcences.8Then the total payments to the government will be
higher than under a simple payment-equals-bid scheme.This is because more aggressive
bidding is induced; the difference among the bidders at the time of bidding become less
important in determining their bids.But royalties introduce another consideration.How
profitable a quota turns out to be depends in part on the winning bidder's efforts after he
receives the import licence.This incentive effect limits the extent of royalties.The
higher the royalty rate, the smaller the share of his profits the licence-holder will retain.
and so the less effort he will make to generateprofits from the licence.Thus the optimal
royalty rate is computed as a trade-off between the first effect — generating high bids -
and the second - creating perverse incentives for the licence-holder.
The government should routinely publicize any information it has about the likely
profitabilIty of holding a quota licence(Milgrom and Weber. 1982. Milgrom.1 985).
As we have seen, the winner's curse induces cautious bidding.By publicizing
information, the government reduces the uncertainty and therefore causes the bidders to
discount their own information less.Government information could include research on
8There are obvious practical difficulties in this which is may or may not be possible for
the government to overcome.
g10
trends in world prices ordomestiC demand, or plans about the government's ownfuture
trade policies.Sometimes the revealed information will lower thebidders' predictions of
the value of a quota licence,and so induce lower bids.On other occasions, it will make
bidders more optimistic.Because at the winner's curse, the latter effectoutweighs the
former on average the policyof releasing information generates higherbids.9Econometric
analysis of oil-rights bidding data byHendricks and Porter (1 988) shows that bidderswith
superior information do indeed bid higher on averagethan uninformed bidders.For art
auctions. Ashenfelter (1 989) finds thatauctioneer's pre-auctlofl estimates, which aremade
public, are good predictors of actual auctionprices.
Finally, notice that all of these methods ofgenerating Increased revenue for the
government tram the quota auctions also generatebetter information about the size of the
quota's protective effect, because the totalvalue of the quota to the bidders Is an upper
bound on the expected total bid revenue, givenrational bidding.
4.Sources of Asymmetric Information
Raising quota revenue Is only the first step of theliberalization packages proposed
by Hufbuaer and Rosen (1986). Lawrence and Litan(1988) and Bergsten •t 11(1987).The
revenue raised in quota auctions can be used toencourage relocation out of protected
industries, after which the protection itself can belowered.We now consider how the
information which Is available to agents (or lackthereof) affects the design of adjustment
policies.
Itis important to distinguish two types ofasymmetric Information which can arise.
Th. first is asymmetric information betweenprivate agents in the economy. which canlead
to failure in the market between them.For example, in the presence of Implicitlabor
9The government cannot, of course, have a policyof releasing information only when itis
good news, for then not releasing the Informationis tantamount to revealing It.contracts, It might be thought that any unemployment resulting from opening trade would
justify some protection.Whether or not this occurs, however, depends on whether the
original equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.1°Fernandez (1988) finds this to be
true In a model of implicit contracts with terms of trade uncertainty. leading to rio role
for trade policy, whereas Riordan and Staiger (1988) reach the opposite conclusion with
adverse selection In the labor market.Conflicting conclusions on the scope for government
intervention have also been reached in models of Infant industryprotection.1 1
We win focus here on another source of asymmetric Information:that which arises
between the ov•rnmentandother agents.Our strategy is to suppose that the economy
begins with acme trade restrictions, given historically.It now wants to dismantle the
restrictions, but to do so in a way that Is voluntarily acceptable to a fraction of the
population.If this action benefits all Individuals, then Pareto gains are obtained.More
generally. political constraints will dictate that some portion of individuals gain.The
difficulty arises In Identifying the gains or losses to individuals, which can be expected to
be private information to themselves and not observed by the government.Conversely.
agents at home or abroad may not be able to identify the true preferences (or typei of the
government, so that the government can hold some private information.We shall begin with
a case where the asymmetry in information may be most acute:across national
boundaries.12
10DixIt c1987..b.19e9) examines whether the competitive equilibrium Is constrained
Pareto optimal In a two sector model with adverse selection, or moral hazard.He argues
that In models where some Insurance markets are missing, it is essential that the reasons
for this be made .ndog.nous.
11Contrast th. results of Grossman and Horn (1988) and Bagwell and Staiger (1989).
1 2One of the best examples of an International asymmetry in information is thetransfer
prlcingproblem, in which a government attempts to tax a multinational based on Its
profits earned in a local facility, but the multinational has better knowledge of intra-firm
Input prices.Prusa (forthcoming) determines the Incentive compatible taxation scheme for
this problem.5.Optimal Design of Trade; and Domestic Policies
5.1Asymmetric Information Between Countries
Why do the VERs exist in the first place?The political economy and trade literature
has debated this questionfor some time, and there is not a singleanswer.1 3one reason
for their use arises when thepolitical pressure for protection is private information to
the home government.For example, in the U.S. an industry seeking importrelief can apply
to the international Trade Commission(ITC). which makes a recommendation to the
President.The ITC operates under various guidelines Inmaking Its decisions, such as
whether or not the domestic industry is injuredby imports, and the reasoning is made
public.The executive branch, however, bases Itsdecision on an interagency committee
chatted by the Office of the U.S. TradeRepresentative, and the deliberations are not made
public.Baldwin (1985. p.195) states:As a consequence of this procedure. both those
favoring and those opposing import relief in a particular casetend to believe that
unjustifiable political factors rather than sound economicreasoning determined the outcome
of the case.
in this setting, trading partners may question thevalidity of an importing country's
need for protection.This is especially true if the importing country is largeenough to
affect world prices and obtain a terms of trade gain throughIts policy actions.Then that
government would have an incentive to seek high trade barriers,claiming that the domestic
Industry is suffering, when in fact the barriers serve only topromote home Interests at
the expens. of foreigners.To resolve problem. it is possible to determineincentive
ccrnpattbi.trade policies, in which the domestic government has noIncentive to overstate
(or understate) the need for protection.We find that:
13 Badwtn (1986) begIns his survey with this precisely this question.For two answers
see DeIrdorff (1987) and Htllman and Ursprung(1986).
12For a large country. transferring a portion of the rents from trade restrictions back to
foreigners Is Incentive compatible(Feenstra and Lewis,1 g87)
The intuition behind this result Is quite straightforward. 8 transferring some of
the tariff revenues or quota rents back to foreigners, the domestic country Is effectivet
pajing for the right to restrict trade.This will be worthwhile onI ifit faces genuine
pressur. from some 1ndustr. so that the political benefit from shifting income towards
this industr exceeds the cost, including the deadweight loss plus the transfer of rents
abroad.For a large countrU. the transfer of quota rents eliminates the incentive to obtain
a terms of trade gain through the trade restriction.
The magnitude of rents to be transferred depends on the Initial situation.If we
start at free trade and one countrV then restricts imports, a transfer of rents which keeps
the trading partner at the free trade level of welfare will be incentive compatible. _OnlU
bg coincidence would this transfer .xactig equal the rents generated from the restriction.
in which case trade restriction takes the form of a VER with foreign firms reaping the
bnefits.For smaller levels of protection, the transfer to foreigners would be less than
the total rents generated.In this case the transfer could take place through the use of
•tarif f-rate quotas,which spectf a certain quota level to which goods are imported dutU
free, after which a tariff is applied.
Returning to our theme of quota auctions, their use in the U.S. would veru likely
violate incentive compatibilitg. since the U.S. is a large enough buger to affect prices in
mang of its import markets.Put differentlU, the availabilltg of thIs source of revenue
could be attractive enough that there would be little incentive to proceed with
liberalization in the affected industrIes.Lawrence and Litan (1 968, chap. 5) propose that
one-half of the revenues from U.S. quota auctions should be returned to exporting countries,
particuIarl the least developed.Feenstra (1989) calculates that a larger amount would
have to be returned to foreigners to maintain incentive compatibilitU, leavin $0.67-i .55
1314
billionavailableto the U.S.This amount is much less than the total available through
auction quotas (th. estimatesin sectIon1range from $3.7-5.15 billion), but could still
finance a significant programof worker adjustment within the U.S.In the next section we
examine the specific features ofdomestic adjustment programs.
5.2AsymmetriC Information Within a Country
Industries facing a reduction in theirtariffs, or elimination of quota protection,
will typically have this actionphased in over a number of years.For example. section 203
of the Trade Act of 1974 speclflea thatTo the extent feasible. anyImport relief provided
pursuant to this section for a periodof more than three years shallbe phased down during
the period of suchrelief.'1This commitment to decrease theImport protection Is not
entirely credible. however, since thenext sentence of the Trade Actallows for extensions:
Ang Import relief provided pursuant tothis sectlon...may be extended by thePresident. at a
level of relief no greater than the levelin effect immediately before suchextension, for
one 3-year period If the Presidentdetermln.s...that such extension Is In thenational
lnterest.1In some cases the continuation ofprotection Is made contingent on specific
actions of reinvestment and modernization bydomestic producers. as occurred with U.S.
steel Industry under the Trade and Tariff Actof 1984. sectIon 806.
Beyond a simple desire to smooth the incomestreams of firms and workers. Is there
any rationale for phasing outprotection slowly?To provide a benchmark, considerthe case
of a small country facing fixed internationalprices.The government wishes to maximize a
social welfare function, and has full Information onthe utility functions and pricesfaced
by individuals.Policy Instruments available Include taxes orsubsidies on all goods and
factors, but not necssarlly lump-sum transfersof Income.In this case we find that
14Trade Act of 1974, section 203(3)(h)(2). PublicLaw 93-618. Jan. 3. 1975.
15Trade Act of 1974, section 203(3)(h)(3). Public Law93-618. Jan. 3, 1975.tariffs are not part of the optimal policy mix:
For a small country, social welfare is maximized by a system of commodity taxes which
leaves producer prices at their free trade level(Dixtt,1 985)
Income redistribution in the open economy is achieved with commodity taxation, but
productive efficiency still holds, as in Diamond and tlirrlees (1971).This result is in line
with the literature on trade and distortions, which would argue that tariffs are a second or
third best way to redistribute income (Bhagwatt. 1968. p. 32).To find an argument for
eliminating tariffs only gradually, we need to drop some of the assumptions of the
benchmark case.
Let us first suppose that some trade protection is Initially in place, sayin the form
of tariffs.Since we are then starting in a distorted situation. we know that a deviation
from first best policies (i.e. productive efficiency) might be desirablein futur. periods.
However, at first glance there does not seem to be any reason to continuetariffs in the
industrU, since that would only serve to expand output and aggravate thedistortion which
already exists.An immediate elimination of tariffs would appear to be desirable on
efficiency grounds.Surprisingly, this intuition Is Incorrect when we incorporate the career
decisions of foresighted workers:
if an industry initially faces a positive tariff, and workers have mobility costs,the
optimal second-period tariff can be positive(Leamer, 1 98O
To understand this result, consider a two-period model with an exogenoustariff in
the first period.Workers must choose their industry of employment in the first period,
and after this, face mobility costs to moving.The government wishes to maximize the
two-period GNP evaluated at world prices.16Suppose that tariffs are eliminated In the
1 6Learner considers an alternative objective function which Incorporatesincome
1516
second period.This action would cause workers to shift out of the(formerly) protected
Industry to the unprotected Industry,and therefore reduce wages in that sector.
Anticipating this, foresighted workers who aremaking career decisions about which
Industry to enter in the firstperiod would tend to choose the protected sector,where
wages are Initiallyhigher.That is. the second period elimination of thetariff can lead to
an expansionof first period output, throughworkers capturing the temporarIly high wages.
This expansion of outputaggravates the existing distortion.It follows that the optimal
second-period tariff can be positive,though it is always less than thefirst period tariff.
A related argument forgradualism arises when the governmentcannot credibly
commit to eliminate protection.As discussed above. U.S.trade laws lack this commitment,
and industries can also attempt tocontinue protection by lobbying toCongress and changing
the law.The uncertainty surrounding the pathof liberalization can be modelled asan
endogencus probability that futuretariffs will be used, say in periodtwo.The possibilIty
of future protection creates anIntertemporaL distortion. leading toexcessive consumption
in period one.The excessive consumption is offset byimposing a tariff initially.With
many periods and learning about thetgpe of government. it can also beshown that the
tariff would eventually be eliminatedi
If Individuals are uncertainaboutthe credibility of government reforms,agradual reduction
of tariffs is optimal(Caivo 1906* Engel and Kletzer 1987 Froot1988)
The above arguments for gradualism relies onindividuals having incomplete
information about governmentactiOns.1 7Let us turn our attention to the conversecase
where the government cannot observe somecharacteristics of agents affected by the
distribution, and this strengthens his argumentfor staged reduction in tariffs.
1 7Along other lines, Matsuyama(forthcoming) examines an infinite horizon,complete
information game of timing, in which thegovernment uses the threat of future
liberalization to Induce the domestic firm toinvest.He finds that optimal temporary
protection may occur in an equilibrium,though this equilibrium is notrenegotiation-Proof.liberalization.In recent gears tht has been much discussion about the possibility of
eliminating agricultural trade barriers and dismantling domestic agricultural price support
programs (see Economic Report of the President. 1987. chap. 5).In this context, isIt
possible and desirable to 'decoupleaid to farmers from price supports, which distort
relative prices and encourage excessive participation in agricultural sectors? The answer
seems to be that complete decoupling is not advisable:
With informational constraints, efficient reorganization (complete decoupling) may be
possible but It is generally undesirable(Lewis. Ware and Feenstra, 1989)
This pessimistic finding arises when workers possess private information about their skill
levels, and their ability to find work In other non—agricultural sectors.To be politically
viable any program to eliminate price supports must adequately compensate the workers for
their losses and relocation costs.But workers command rents from their private
information, which renders a complete decoupling of price supports too expensive for the
government to fund.instead, the use of (nonlinear) production subsidies In conjunction with
income transfers becomes optimal, meaning that productive efficiency is not obtained due to
the Informational constraints.
5.3 Pareto Gains From Trade
Our final example of how incomplete information can affect optimal trade policy
goes to the heart of economists acceptanc, of free trade:the idea that gains for all
individuals (Pareto gains) can be achieved.it has been known for some time that under the
standard Arrow-Debreu assumptions, Pareto gains can be achieved by using lump-sum
transfers within a country.18it can be expected, however, that governments would not
See the brief surveys by Chipman (1987. section 3) and Kemp (1987).
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have the informationneeded to calculate these iurnp-sUflltransfers.1 9Dlxit and Norman
haverecently argued that Pareto gains can beachieved with just a system of taxes on goods
and factors, designed so that consumersface autarky prices while producers face free trade
price3
it producers are faced withtree trade prices. whil• consumers face autarkyprices for
goods and factors, then the governmentraises non-negative revnu(Dixit and Norman.
1980. p. 79 1986)
This result is analogous to our benchmark casein the Last section. In that productive
efficiency is maintained.Indeed, the objective of Pareto gains canjust be considered an
extreme form of the social welfare functionin the last section. where now anincrease In
social welfare requires an Increase in •achindividual's utility over autarky.
This striking result by Dixit and Norman seemsto make Pareto gains informationatly
feasible, at least if the autarky and free tradeprices for goods and factors can be observed.
so that the requisite tax rates can becomputed. We would like to suggest. however,that
the implementation of Pareto gains Is not aswatertight as it seems, but that there are
substantial informational difficulties still hidden in theDixit-Norman scheme.20ro see
this, suppose that all individuals have some mobility costsin moving factors of production
19The needed Information is the sutarky and free tradevectors of prices for goods and
factors (denoted by p0 and p. respectively), and theautarky consumption and factor supply
vector for •ach Individual (denoted byxoh, where negative components of x are factor
supplies and hsl ,...,H).The autarky choices satisfy the budgetconstraint pOxOh0.Then
consider opening the economy to free trade with thelump-sum transfers1h• (p -pO)'xoh.
The free trade budget constraint for an individual becomesp'x' c (p - pO)'xOh. from which It
is Immediate thatx0h is still feasible.Moreover, summing1hover individuals, we can use
the technique of Dixit and Norman (1980, p.79) to show that the aggregate transfer is non-
positive, and therefore feasible for the government.This argument shows that it is not
necessary to know the utility function ofindividuals.
20Our discussion of mobility costs i closely relatedto the critique by Kemp and Wan
(1986)the Dixit-Norman scheme of commodity taxes willnot raise posltlvr revenue unless
the resulting production point differs from autarky.between industrtesthese may be individual skill differences across industnes; actual or
psychic moving costs; time lost In unemployment or retraining. etc.The mobility costs can
be modelled as Individual transformation functions, which have.as Inputs the individual
supply of each factor, and as outputs the effective supply to each industry.21The natural
advantages from supplying all of one factor to a single industry could be captured by
assuming that the transformation function Is convex in outputs, but to stay In an Arrow-
Debreu framework we shall suppose that it is concave.
TO achieve Pareto gains in this economy It Is necessary to apply the Dixit-Norman
scheme of commodity taxes to these transformation functions, treating them Just like the
production function of a firm.This means that the outputs (factor supplies to each
industry) must receive the prevailing free trade wages, while the Inputs (raw labor or
capital from an individual) should be taxed or subsidised to receive their autarky return.
However, the prices of inputs are th. shadow value of factors supplied by an individual, and
these would not observed by the government.In particular, the government could not treat
the actual wage earned by an individual as an estimate of their shadow price of labor, since
this would create an incentive to choose a low paying Job (e.g. unemployment) and be
subsidized for the difference between this wage and earnings in autarky.Put simply, when
we recognize that wages net of mobility costs for a given occupation differ across
individuals, it may not be possible to calculate the subsidy needed to provide each person
their autarky earnings without creating adverse Incentives.
8.Conclusions
We have argued that the information available to governments is a critical factor In
the design of international trade policies.This is seen most clearly in recent proposals to
21This transformation function could itself be the result of past Investments in human
capital, as analysed by Grossman and Shapiro (1982).
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auction U.S. import, quotas, where the auctions serve as a devise to reveaLthe value of the
quota licenses.Theoretical results in this area serve as a practical guid. on designing an
auction to obtain the highest revenue.These funds, like tariff revenues, can be earmarked
to encourage relocation outof protected industries.The features of an adjustment plan
win depend on the asymmetries ofinformation.We have seen that a staged reduction in
tariffs may be optimal; that productive efficiency maynot be desired (in contrast to the
case of completeinformation) and that the possibility of Pareto gains from trade may be
compromised by incomplete information.
The research we have drawn from is recent, and muchwork remains to be done.We
will mention two general areas of research.First, our discussion of trade and domestic
policies dealt with those that were socially optimal, eitherfrom a global or domestic
viewpoint.But itis equally important to understand how Incompleteinformation affects
the conduct of firms and governments in non-cooperativesettings.For example, could the
widespread use of VER5 be explained as the outcome of a non-cooperative gamebetween
governments, perhaps because giving the quota rents to foreigners acts as asignalthat the
import restriction is really needed?Bagwell and Staiger (198e) do find a role for the
sharing of quota rents across countries in a non-cooperativ, model, similar in spirit to the
result with asymmetric Information (section 5.1).Along other lines. Jensen and Thursby
(1989) examine whether one country would want to mislead the other about its desire to
impos. trade barriers, and establish a reputation which could be useful in the future.
Second. our suggestion that Pareto gains from trade cannot be achieved deserves
further attention.One approach is to examine more specific situations to see if gains are
possible.Bnecher and Choudhrt (1989) consider a model where people rather than goods
cross borders, but constrain the commodity taxes to not discriminatebetween people of
dIfferent nationality located in the same country.Under this non-discrimination rule, they
argue that no commodity taxation scheme can make every home nationalbetter of f.Another
approach is to expand the list of policy instruments.Since our discussion in section 5.3suggested that mobility costs are a hindrance to acheving Pareto gains. itis natural to
introduce Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) policies.The equity and efficiency properties
of various TAA programs are examined by Diamond (1 982). Brander and Spencer (1989) and
Feenstra and Lewis (1989). though none of these authors find a plan which generates gains
for all individuals.The empirical relevance of mobility costs is highlighted by Richardson
(1982) and Bednarzik and Orr (1984). who report that TAA recipients often return to their
former jobs after being unemployed, rather thanswitching industries.Determining whether
it is possible to implement Pareto gains when workers haveprivate mobility costs is an
open, and important, area for research.
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